The Transfer Of Power Agreement 1947

16 As has already been said, all those versions were eventually abandoned, so that there was nothing left but the `unchanged` policy. Nehrus` note of May 11 was circulated to the Indian Committee on May 16. The New Draft of the Viceroy and the revision of the India Office were circulated on 17 May (L/PO/429). It is curious that Nehru himself, in a letter of 16 May 1947 to the Viceroy, proposes that the words that the Viceroy introduced to respond to his objections be “deleted” and simply replaced by a reference to the cabinet mission plan of 16 May 1946. Did he find “hope” too weak? Could he have considered the firm`s mission plan as a secure integrator? The question is not very clear and I tend to think that he did not, wrongly, succeed in guaranteeing what had been designed and would have been a boost to integration, that is to say a somewhat modest support for what the viceroy was finally to try to do. Menon was certainly looking for such a “kick-off” almost two months later (see note 20). The “compromise” version was indeed a return to the one originally conceived in Delhi. It fit well with Corfield`s views. It should be noted, however, that at the time of its elaboration – probably as early as mid-April – the Viceroy`s General Staff had made little noise and that the question of the status of Dominion – which one might think would create new responsibilities for its successor Governments – had not yet been clearly raised. 13 The conflict between congress and the Political Department was very long. Everyone interpreted the 1946 memorandum as perceived in their own interest: for Corfield, when paramountcy was obsolete, the states were in favour of their independence, from which they could, but only if they wanted to, enter into free negotiations with a view to a “political agreement” with the Indian government; For Nehru, the independence of the states and the disruption of the country as “backdoor anarchy” and therefore impossible, the option of not having a “political agreement” was not open. The logic of some led to the proposal that States should remain free to establish contacts as they wished – with the Constituent Assembly, if they wished integration into the Union, with individual government departments of administrative relations and with the Department of Foreign Affairs if they wanted to be independent States (Corfield`s long memo of 27 March 1947, R/3/1/136). .

. .

Comments are closed.